Psychology Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Self-ascription, philosophy: self-attribution is the identification of properties by a subject that refers to itself through this act. The important fact is that this type of statements can claim a higher degree of certainty than external attribution b y a different person. See also certainty, attribution, ascription, truth conditions, privileged access, introspection, I, self, person._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Gilbert Ryle on Self- Ascription - Dictionary of Arguments
Frank I 650 Self-Ascription/Ryle: self-ascription is like foreign attribution. We observe ourselves as we observes others (WittgensteinVs - DavidsonVs). First, I usually know what I think before I pronounce it. Second, I may be wrong - but still there are the same criteria as for foreign attribution.(1) 1. Donald Davidson (1987): Knowing One's Own Mind, in: Proceedings and Adresses of the American Philosophical Association LX (1987), 441-4 58. RyleVsPriviledged access. RyleVsAuthority of the First Person. RyleVsIncorrigibility. >Self-knowledge, >Self-identification, >Privileged access, >Introspection, >Incorrigibility, >Authority of the First Person, >Private language, >Beetle-example. >Privileged access/Wittgenstein >Introspection/Dennett._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Ryle I G. Ryle The Concept of Mind, Chicago 1949 German Edition: Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
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> Counter arguments against Ryle
> Counter arguments in relation to Self- Ascription
